Implementing the macroprudential approach to financial regulation and supervision. by Borio, C.
Banque de France ￿ Financial Stability Review ￿ No. 13 – The future of ﬁ  nancial regulation ￿ September 2009  31
Implementing the macroprudential approach 
to ﬁ  nancial regulation and supervision
CLAUDIO BORIO
Head of Research and Policy Analysis
Bank for International Settlements
There is now a widespread recognition in the policy community of the need to strengthen the macroprudential 
orientation of ﬁ  nancial regulatory and supervisory frameworks. At the same time, the usage of the term 
“macroprudential” remains ambiguous. This essay summarises the speciﬁ  c deﬁ  nition and characterisation of 
the term that was developed in the early 2000s at the BIS and outlines the policies needed for implementing 
the approach. The policies are discussed with reference to two dimensions of the approach. The ﬁ  rst is the 
cross-sectional dimension and is concerned with how aggregate risk is distributed in the ﬁ  nancial system 
at a given point in time. The policy issue here is how to calibrate prudential instruments so as to address 
common exposures across ﬁ  nancial institutions and the contribution of each institution to system-wide 
tail risk. The second is the time dimension and is concerned with how aggregate risk evolves over time. 
The policy issue is how to dampen the inherent procyclicality of the ﬁ  nancial system, seen as a key source 
of ﬁ  nancial instability. The essay also brieﬂ  y considers the implications of the adoption of a macroprudential 
approach for the institutional set-up.
NB: This paper draws in part on Borio and Drehmann (2008). The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the Bank for 
International Settlements.
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R
ecent international reports have 
recommended that ﬁ  nancial  regulatory 
and supervisory frameworks strengthen 
their macroprudential orientation (G20, 2009, and 
Larosière, 2009). The term has become so well 
accepted that, paraphrasing Milton Friedman, 
one could say that “we are all macroprudentialists 
now”. And yet, a decade ago, the term was barely 
used. And it would have been hard for supervisors 
to recognise that their tasks involved a signiﬁ  cant 
macroprudential dimension, let alone that it would 
have been desirable to strengthen it.
In fact, the term is not new. At the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS), its usage goes back to at least the late 
1970s, to denote a systemic or system-wide orientation 
of regulatory and supervisory frameworks and the link 
to the macroeconomy, although public references are 
of more recent vintage (e.g. BIS, 1986). It was already 
recognised then that focusing exclusively on the 
ﬁ  nancial strength of individual institutions could miss 
an important dimension of the task of securing ﬁ  nancial 
stability. However, it was only at the beginning of the 
new century that efforts were made to deﬁ  ne the term 
more precisely, so as to derive more speciﬁ  c implications 
for the architecture of prudential arrangements 
(Crockett,  2000, Borio, 2003). This was a phase during 
which its usage was already becoming more common 
(e.g. International Monetary Fund, 2000). Subsequently, 
the macroprudential perspective slowly gained ground, 
until the current ﬁ  nancial crisis gave it an extraordinary boost, 
as described in Knight (2006), White (2006) and Borio (2008).
At the same time, the usage of the term remains 
ambiguous. Sometimes, it is used synonymously 
with prudential approaches designed to limit the 
procyclicality of the ﬁ  nancial system, seen as a key 
cause of ﬁ  nancial instability. At other times, it is 
still vaguely used to denote approaches designed 
to address “systemic” or “system-wide” risk more 
generally. What does “macroprudential” really 
mean? What are its implications for policy? 
Drawing on the long BIS tradition, this essay seeks to 
answer those two questions. It ﬁ  rst summarises the 
speciﬁ  c deﬁ  nition and characterisation of the term 
“macroprudential” developed in the early 2000s at 
the BIS. It then considers the outline of policies that 
could strengthen the macroprudential orientation 
of regulatory and supervisory frameworks. In the 
process, it brings together what may appear as 
unrelated strands of analysis and policy initiatives.
1| THE MACROPRUDENTIAL 
  APPROACH: DEFINITION, 
  KEY FEATURES AND IMPLICATIONS
1|1 Deﬁ  nition and key features
It is useful to deﬁ  ne “macroprudential” with the help 
of its antonym, “microprudential”, and to do so in an 
intentionally stylised way. So deﬁ  ned, by analogy 
with black and white, the macroprudential and 
microprudential orientations would normally coexist 
in the more natural shades of grey of regulatory and 
supervisory arrangements.
As deﬁ  ned here, the three fundamental features 
that distinguish the macroprudential from the 
microprudential approach to regulation and 
supervision relate to objectives, focus and the 
characterisation of risk (Table 1).
First, the proximate objective of a macroprudential 
approach is to limit the risk of episodes of 
system-wide ﬁ   nancial distress so as to contain 
their cost for the macroeconomy. By contrast, the 
proximate objective of the microprudential approach 
is to limit the risk of failure of individual institutions, 
regardless of their impact on the overall economy. In 
turn, this is best rationalised in terms of consumer 
(depositor or investor) protection. 
Table 1
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Second, as a result, the focus of the macroprudential 
approach is the ﬁ  nancial system as a whole; that of 
its microprudential counterpart is the individual 
institution. This distinguishing feature can best be 
illustrated with an analogy. One can think of the 
ﬁ  nancial system as a portfolio of securities, with 
each security representing a ﬁ  nancial institution. 
The microprudential approach would care equally 
about losses on each individual security; the 
macroprudential one would focus on the losses 
on the overall portfolio. What is crucial from a 
macroprudential perspective is the degree of 
diversiﬁ  cation or concentration of risk not in individual 
institutions but in the overall system. Thus, what 
matters is the common (correlated) exposures across 
ﬁ  nancial institutions, not so much those within the 
portfolios of individual institutions, which represent 
the main concern of the microprudential approach.
Finally, a macroprudential approach treats aggregate 
risk as dependent on the collective behaviour of 
institutions – in technical terms, as “endogenous”. 
This is because, collectively, institutions can affect 
the prices of ﬁ  nancial assets, the quantities transacted 
(e.g. borrowed and lent) and hence the strength 
of the economy itself. This, in turn, has powerful 
feedback effects on the soundness of the institutions. 
By contrast, given its focus on individual institutions, 
a microprudential perspective ignores such feedbacks, 
i.e. it treats risk as “exogenous”. Taken in isolation, 
individual institutions will generally have little impact 
on market prices or the economy as a whole. Indeed, 
this is very much how individual institutions treat risk: 
they regard asset prices, market/credit conditions and 
economic activity as unaffected by their decisions. 
For example, risk models and stress tests take as 
given the possible range of asset price movements, 
probabilities of default and the macroeconomy.1
1|2 Implications
The differences in focus and conception of risk have 
important implications for how the sources of ﬁ  nancial 
distress are assessed in the two approaches. 
From a macroprudential perspective, it is possible 
that individual institutions may appear to be safe, 
while the ﬁ   nancial system as a whole is not.2 
This would occur, for instance, if greater diversiﬁ  cation 
of risk in the portfolio of individual institutions was 
achieved by increasing its concentration in the 
overall ﬁ  nancial system. Even as they disperse risk 
in their own balance sheets, institutions could be 
raising their exposure to common risk factors, such 
as through greater similarity in their portfolios. This 
would mean that negative shocks would affect more 
institutions simultaneously, i.e. that systemic, 
non-diversiﬁ  able risk in the system would increase.3
In addition, the endogeneity of risk highlights the 
possibility that actions that are optimal from the 
perspective of individual institutions may result in 
undesirable outcomes for the system as a whole, 
through adverse feedback effects. For example, 
retrenchment at times of ﬁ  nancial strain is rational 
and almost irresistible for individual participants. 
If generalised, however, it could make everyone 
worse off, by inducing ﬁ  re sales and tighter credit 
conditions. Such a possibility is ruled out by 
deﬁ  nition in the microprudential approach, as risk 
is treated as exogenous.
This sharp contrast between the two approaches 
is reﬂ  ected in the fundamental disagreement over 
the validity of the microprudential dictum: “for the 
ﬁ  nancial system to be sound it is necessary and 
sufﬁ  cient that each individual institution is sound”. 
From a macroprudential perspective, this condition 
is not necessary: the output costs of ﬁ  nancial 
stress at individual institutions, or even groups of 
institutions, may not be large enough. More subtly, it 
is not sufﬁ  cient either: by failing to take into account 
common exposures across ﬁ  nancial  institutions 
and the endogeneity of risk, a microprudential 
approach may not promote overall ﬁ  nancial stability 
effectively.
The macroprudential approach to ﬁ  nancial 
regulation and supervision is best thought of as 
consisting of two dimensions, which have different 
implications for the calibration of prudential tools. 
1  This also indicates that the previous analogy with the portfolio of securities is incomplete, since portfolio managers would also treat the underlying sources of risk 
as exogenous.
2  For an early academic contribution on this, see Hellwig (1995). See also Acharya (2001) for a perspective highlighting the importance of the cross-sectional dimension 
of a macroprudential approach, without using this speciﬁ  c terminology.
3  To return to the portfolio analogy, the total variance of a portfolio is equal to the sum of the variances of the returns on each security plus that of the covariances. 
The return on each security (read ﬁ  nancial institution) may have a lower variance, but that of the portfolio as a whole may in fact be larger if the covariances 
increase by enough. The whole is not equal to the sum of its parts.
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These dimensions are often not sufﬁ  ciently 
distinguished in the common usage of the term. 
The ﬁ  rst concerns how risk is distributed in the 
ﬁ  nancial  system  at a given point in time —  the 
“cross-sectional dimension”. The second concerns 
how aggregate risk evolves over time — the “time 
dimension”. The ﬁ  rst is like taking a snapshot picture 
of the ﬁ  nancial system; the second is like following 
its evolution in a movie. 
The key issue in the cross-sectional dimension is the 
existence of common (correlated) exposures. These 
arise either because institutions are directly exposed 
to the same or similar asset classes or because of 
indirect exposures associated with linkages among 
them (e.g. counterparty relationships). Returning 
to the analogy with the portfolio of securities, 
the main distinction is between systemic or 
non-diversiﬁ  able risk across institutions, on the one 
hand, and idiosyncratic (or institution-speciﬁ  c) risk, 
on the other.
Correspondingly, the guiding principle for the 
calibration of prudential tools is to tailor them to the 
individual institutions’ contribution to system-wide 
risk. Ideally, this would be done in a top-down way. 
One would start from a measure of system-wide tail 
risk, calculate the contribution of each institution 
to it and then adjust the tools (capital requirements, 
insurance premia, etc.) accordingly. This would 
imply having tighter standards for institutions whose 
contribution is larger. This contrasts sharply with 
the microprudential approach, which would have 
common standards for all institutions.
The key issue in the time dimension is how 
system-wide risk can be ampliﬁ  ed by interactions 
within the ﬁ  nancial system as well as between the 
ﬁ  nancial system and the real economy. This is what 
procyclicality is all about (e.g. BIS, 2001, Borio et 
al., 2001, Brunnermeier et al., 2009). Here feedback 
effects are of the essence. During expansions, the 
mutually reinforcing process between falling risk 
perceptions, rising risk tolerance, weakening ﬁ  nancing 
constraints, rising leverage, higher market liquidity, 
booming asset prices and hence expenditures feeds 
into itself, potentially leading to the overextension 
of balance sheets. This process, then, operates in 
reverse, and more abruptly, as ﬁ  nancial  strains 
emerge, amplifying ﬁ  nancial distress. The main 
policy question, therefore, is how to dampen the 
inherent procyclicality of the ﬁ  nancial system.
The corresponding guiding principle is to calibrate 
policy tools so as to encourage the build-up of buffers 
in good times so that they can be used as strains 
materialise. This would help to limit the costs of 
incipient ﬁ  nancial stress, by allowing the system 
to absorb the shock better. Moreover, the build-up 
of the buffers, to the extent that it acted as a kind 
of dragging anchor or “soft” speed limit, could also 
help to restrain the build-up of risk-taking during the 
expansion phase. As a result, it would also limit the 
risk of ﬁ  nancial distress in the ﬁ  rst place.
2| THE MACROPRUDENTIAL 
  APPROACH: IMPLEMENTATION
The previous analysis highlights how the 
macroprudential and microprudential perspectives 
inevitably coexist in current ﬁ  nancial regulatory 
and supervisory frameworks. For example, 
tailoring the degree of prudential oversight to the 
systemic importance of institutions or limiting risk 
concentration across the system is consistent with 
a macroprudential perspective. By contrast, peer 
group analysis is micro: it seeks to identify outliers, 
without regard for whether average performance is 
appropriate. Importantly, also micro is the general 
practice of calibrating prudential tools uniformly 
with respect to the risk proﬁ   le of individual 
institutions (e.g. calibrating capital requirements so 
as to achieve a common probability of failure for all 
institutions). The key policy challenge, therefore, is 
how to strengthen the macroprudential orientation 
of current arrangements.
The urgency of this task has been highlighted by 
the current ﬁ  nancial crisis (Borio, 2008). The crisis 
has put a premium on the need to assess risk from a 
system-wide perspective. It would have been 
impossible to detect the threat without considering 
the exposures held outside the banking system. In the 
run-up to the current crisis, it was erroneously felt 
that securitising mortgage portfolios, and slicing and 
dicing risk in the process, would make the overall 
system safer. And the mistaken belief that the system 
was better diversiﬁ  ed paradoxically encouraged each 
institution to take on more risk. Moreover, the crisis 
has been a quintessential example of procyclicality 
at work. Against the background of low interest 
rates and aggressive risk-taking, benign economic 
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conditions masked the gradual overextension in 
private sector balance sheets. Traditional tell-tale 
signs of the build-up of risk included booming 
credit and asset prices, especially in the residential 
property sector, as well as unusually low volatilities 
and risk premia across a broad spectrum of asset 
classes. Once these ﬁ  nancial imbalances ﬁ  nally 
unwound, the process went into reverse with a 
vengeance. It triggered and ampliﬁ  ed  ﬁ  nancial 
distress and crippled the real economy.
What follows discusses, sequentially, the outline 
of the efforts needed to implement the guiding 
principles in the cross-sectional and time dimensions, 
respectively. It then considers brieﬂ  y the implications 
for the institutional set-up. 
2|1 The  cross-sectional  dimension: 
 common  exposures
Current prudential frameworks to some extent 
already recognise the relevance of common 
exposures across ﬁ  nancial institutions. Supervisors 
may, on a discretionary basis, constrain overall 
exposures to sectors that they regard as particularly 
risky at particular points in time (e.g. real estate, 
leveraged loans). More importantly, in several 
jurisdictions authorities have already sought to tailor 
the supervisory scrutiny of individual institutions to 
their systemic importance, devoting more resources 
to them. Steps in this direction have received 
greater attention since the recent ﬁ  nancial strains. 
For example, a case in point is Switzerland, where 
the authorities have introduced tighter regulatory 
and supervisory requirements for the country’s two 
large internationally active banks.
Strengthening further the macroprudential 
orientation would call for more systematic efforts to 
measure the contribution of individual institutions 
to system-wide risk from a top-down perspective. 
Such contributions would be determined by several 
characteristics of the institutions, notably their 
probability of default, relative size and their (direct 
and indirect) exposure to systemic risk, including 
that portion that reﬂ  ects linkages among institutions, 
such as through counterparty relationships.
The main limitation here is that quantitative 
methodologies capable of informing such judgments 
are still in their infancy. Some tools, such as those 
for the estimation of domino effects through 
counterparty relationships, can provide a sense 
of the consequences of the failure of one or more 
institutions. However, they suffer from a number 
of drawbacks. They are exceedingly mechanical, 
eschewing behavioural responses; they call for 
information about such linkages that is generally 
not available, except perhaps for speciﬁ  c markets 
(e.g. organised exchanges); and they provide no 
information about the likelihood of a stress event 
(e.g. Upper, 2007). Other approaches, which 
generally rely on market prices (e.g. equities, 
credit spreads), can yield measures of system-wide 
tail risk, at least for groups of institutions. This is 
because they draw on the multivariate probability 
distribution that underlies asset price movements. 
Examples are measures of tail risk based on extreme 
value theory (e.g. Geluk et al., 2007) or quantile 
regressions (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2008). 
However, either it is impossible to decompose and 
allocate these measures to individual institutions 
or, even if in principle feasible, the corresponding 
methodologies have not been explored much.
In research with colleagues at the BIS, we are seeking 
to overcome these limitations (Borio et al., 2009). 
We have developed ways of decomposing aggregate 
measures of tail risk for groups of institutions, such 
as system-wide credit value-at-risk or expected 
shortfall, into additive contributions of the individual 
institutions. As other methodologies for measuring 
credit risk, this procedure relies on estimates of 
probabilities of default and exposures to systemic   
risk that are based on market prices.4 Moreover, 
the approach to decomposition is quite general 
and intuitive and can be applied to various metrics 
of system-wide risk. The approach can help to 
structure policymakers’ thinking about the issues. 
In principle, tools of this kind could also be used to 
inform transparent adjustments to instruments such 
as capital requirements, the intensity of supervisory 
review or insurance premia.
From an operational perspective, three issues 
loom large when calibrating prudential tools with 
reference to the contribution to system-wide risk of 
4 While  the  speciﬁ  c implementation is based on market prices, the inputs could also be drawn from assessments of supervisors or combinations of such assessments 
and market prices.
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individual institutions: the relationship between the 
cross-sectional and the time dimension; the choice 
of “portfolio” of institutions; and, closely related, the 
scope of regulation (or its “perimeter”).
Approaches that estimate the marginal contribution 
of institutions based on market prices should take into 
account a fundamental limitation: these prices can 
be very deceptive measures of the time dimension of 
risk. This is, in fact, one of the key manifestations 
of procyclicality. Market price measures of risk tend 
to be unusually low also when risks are building up, 
reﬂ   ecting aggressive risk-taking in the system: 
risk premia, measured and implied volatilities and 
correlations are unusually low. In other words, market 
prices behave more like thermometers of ﬁ  nancial 
distress, measuring its temperature once it rises, than 
as barometers of distress, providing signals of its future 
materialisation (Borio and Drehmann, 2008). Hence 
the paradox of ﬁ  nancial instability: the system appears 
strongest precisely when it is most vulnerable. This 
can easily contaminate the point-in-time measures of 
system-wide risk and also those of individual 
institutions’ contributions to it.
One way of tackling this problem is to follow similar 
procedures to those adopted to adjust risk measures 
when addressing procyclicality (see below). This 
means using stressed parameters (derived from 
periods of ﬁ   nancial strains) or averages over 
long time periods. More generally, the objective 
would be to focus on the relative contribution of 
institutions to system-wide risk, rather than on their 
absolute one. And the risk of estimation error could be 
further reduced by dividing institutions into different 
categories, such as through a rating system.
The deﬁ   nition of the correct portfolio is not 
straightforward. Conceptually, how much of the 
ﬁ  nancial system should be captured before the 
estimates can be regarded as reliable guides to 
system-wide risk? And should the portfolio relate to 
domestic ﬁ  nancial systems or to those institutions 
that comprise the core of the global ﬁ  nancial system? 
Moreover, the data needed for the calculations may 
not exist for signiﬁ  cant parts of the ﬁ  nancial sector 
(e.g. equities for savings or cooperative banks). 
A large dose of pragmatism is required. The correct 
portfolio will depend on priorities as well as the scope 
for effective international coordination. Practical 
limitations on the availability of the data may be 
addressed by using approximations or requiring 
ﬁ  rms to issue the instruments whose secondary 
market prices would be used in the estimation.
This also raises the question of the perimeter of 
regulation. A macroprudential framework would 
need to address the risks generated by all ﬁ  nancial 
institutions that are capable, on their own, as a 
group and through system interactions, to cause 
material system-wide damage. To the extent that 
an indirect approach based on restrictions on the 
regulated institutions proved insufﬁ  cient, whether 
in terms of the ability to request information or take 
remedial action, the extension of the coverage of the 
prudential framework would need to be considered. 
To varying degrees, recent reports point in that 
direction (G20, 2009, Larosière, 2009).
The analytical efforts to address the cross-sectional 
dimension of the macroprudential approach have 
so far been more directly applicable to instruments 
like capital or insurance schemes. Importantly, 
they have not targeted liquidity. To be sure, a 
number of suggestions have been made, including 
those in Brunnermeier et al. (2009) and Perotti 
and Suarez (2009). These have been portrayed as 
tackling mainly procyclicality, by acting as speed 
limits during expansions or establishing buffers that 
can cushion strains. However, all of these proposals 
are calibrated with respect to characteristics of the 
balance sheets of institutions on a standalone basis. 
They fail to take into account common liquidity 
exposures across institutions. This is an area that 
deserves further attention.
2|2  The time dimension: procyclicality
In contrast to the scarcity of work considering the 
cross-sectional dimension, the time dimension has 
beneﬁ  ted from major analytical efforts in recent 
years. It has already given rise to a number of policy 
initiatives to dampen procyclicality (e.g. G20, 2009, 
Financial Stability Forum, 2009). The goal has been to 
limit the degree to which the prudential framework 
and accounting practices may contribute to the 
procyclicality of the system and to introduce an 
element of countercyclicality into the arrangements. 
Rather than discussing that work in detail, what 
follows puts forward ﬁ  ve general principles that could 
guide current efforts. In the process, it also highlights 
some thorny issues that deserve special attention.
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First, a holistic approach is needed. A broad range of 
policies have an impact on the procyclicality of the 
ﬁ  nancial system. Thus, the required adjustments 
in the prudential framework will depend on 
the characteristics of other policies and on any 
adjustments made to them. For example, the current 
trend towards fair value accounting (FVA) is likely 
to add to procyclicality by making valuations more 
sensitive to the economic cycle: it embeds evolving 
estimates of future cash ﬂ  ows and risk premia in the 
accounting ﬁ  gures (e.g. Borio and Tsatsaronis, 2004, 
Goodhart, 2004, Adrian and Shin, 2008). Other 
obvious examples are the characteristics of deposit 
insurance schemes, of resolution procedures and 
of the monetary policy regime in place. Insurance 
schemes that are not pre-funded require institutions 
to pay precisely when the system is facing strains. 
Resolution procedures for individual institutions 
that do not take into account system-wide strains 
could force excessive liquidation. And monetary 
policy regimes that do not restrain the build-up of 
ﬁ  nancial imbalances, in the form of unusually rapid 
credit and asset price increases, when inﬂ  ation is 
low and stable, may unwittingly accommodate their 
expansion (e.g. Borio et al., 2001, BIS, 2008).
Second, it is important to build on existing arrangements. 
In particular, Basel II represents a major improvement 
over Basel I. Through Pillar 1, it has greatly improved 
the ability to discriminate across borrowers in the 
cross-section, by aligning capital charges much more 
closely with the relative riskiness of exposures. It 
has thereby greatly tightened the link between risk 
measures and minimum capital and reduced the 
scope for regulatory arbitrage. Through Pillar 2, it 
has substantially enhanced the scope for supervisors 
to require levels of capital above the minima, thereby 
allowing them to tailor the capital cushion to the 
risk incurred by institutions (“supervisory review”). 
Through Pillar 3, it has provided a tool to strengthen 
risk disclosures and market discipline. Above all, 
Basel II has helped to spread and hard-wire best risk 
management practice within the banking industry. 
The challenge in this area is to reduce the procyclical 
sensitivity of the framework without sacriﬁ  cing 
its ability to differentiate across risks at a point in 
time, and to do so through simple and transparent 
adjustments.
Third, the spectrum of options for regulatory capital 
ranges from reducing its cyclical risk sensitivity to 
deliberately introducing elements of countercyclicality 
into the framework. There are various ways in which 
this can de done (e.g. Gordy and Howells, 2006, 
Borio and Drehmann, 2008, FSF, 2009). Examples 
are reducing the cyclical sensitivity of minimum 
requirements, by further smoothing the inputs 
(e.g. based on through-the-cycle or stressed 
parameters of probabilities of default) or the outputs, 
and adding transparent countercyclical adjustments 
that would allow the build-up and release of capital 
buffers. The adjustments could be hard-wired to the 
minima (Pillar 1 in Basel II) or encouraged through 
the supervisory review process (Pillar 2).
Fourth, while a lot of attention has been devoted to 
capital requirements, other prudential tools are also 
worth considering. As a preliminary step, “prudential 
ﬁ  lters” can be applied to accounting ﬁ  gures to offset 
undesirable features, such as loan provisioning 
rules that are not sufﬁ  ciently forward-looking and 
prudent (see below). As the availability of funding 
liquidity is procyclical, funding liquidity standards 
that rely on quantitative minimum requirements 
that are invariant to the state of the economy 
risk exacerbating ﬁ   nancial strains once they 
emerge. In other words, just like invariant capital 
requirements, they would act as shock ampliﬁ  ers 
rather than shock absorbers (Goodhart, 2008, Borio, 
2009). Increasing variation margins when volatility 
spikes can have a similar effect. High loan-to-value 
ratios can add to procyclicality by increasing the 
sensitivity of the supply of credit to the assets used 
as collateral (Borio et al., 2001). Arrangements could 
therefore be adjusted in all of these areas.
Fifth, the operational framework should rely as 
far as possible on built-in (automatic) stabilisers 
rather than discretion. This would help address 
the limitations in the measurement of aggregate 
risks in real time, which can make discretionary 
action error-prone. Admittedly, recent work at the 
BIS has conﬁ  rmed that simple leading indicators 
of ﬁ  nancial system distress can be developed and 
perform fairly well also out of sample. In particular, 
they provide warnings of the current crisis (Borio 
and Drehmann, 2009). Even so, the margin of error 
remains signiﬁ  cant. Moreover, relying on automatic 
stabilisers would limit the danger that, even when 
risks are correctly identiﬁ  ed, action may not be taken 
at all. The fear of going against the manifest view 
of markets can have a powerful inhibiting effect. 
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Once in place, automatic stabilisers can act as an 
effective pre-commitment device. They can help 
shift the burden of proof (Landau, 2009).
At the same time, automatic stabilisers and 
discretionary measures should not be seen as 
mutually exclusive. Discretionary measures could 
complement automatic stabilisers if the latter faced 
design limitations. Likewise, discretionary measures 
might be more easily tailored to the nature of the 
build-up in risk-taking and vulnerabilities as long as 
these are identiﬁ  able in real time. They may also be 
harder to arbitrage away, as circumvention becomes 
easier over time. The key issue would be how to 
constrain and discipline any such discretion.
There are a number of areas in which automatic 
stabilisers could be considered. As regards collateral 
practices, possibilities include seeking to implement 
through-the-cycle margining requirements (Geithner, 
2006, FSF, 2009) and enforcing maximum loan-to-value 
ratios that are low and/or based on valuations that are 
less sensitive to market prices. Similarly, supervisors 
may consider that accounting standards do not 
allow for sufﬁ  ciently forward-looking or prudent 
provisions. One notable example is obstacles to the 
adoption of through-the-cycle provisions for loans, 
sometimes known as “dynamic provisions”, based on 
average historical experience, in place until recently 
in Spain (e.g. Jiménez and Saurina, 2006). In that 
case, supervisors can add the difference between 
what they ﬁ  nd appropriate and the accounting ﬁ  gures 
to minimum capital requirements. Importantly, 
adjustments to capital standards within the existing 
framework could be made based on speciﬁ  c rules 
rather than discretion. 
However, it is not hard to see how rule-based 
adjustments may be difﬁ  cult in some cases. Consider 
the objective of establishing countercyclical 
regulatory capital buffers. It is not easy to devise rules 
that are equally effective during the expansion and 
contraction phases. For example, linking minimum 
requirements to credit growth, as suggested by 
Goodhart and Persaud (2008), could be effective 
during the expansion phase, but could fail to release 
buffers at the right time. As the current crisis has 
demonstrated again, the credit slowdown tends to 
lag the emergence of strains, not least owing to the 
drawdown of credit lines. Likewise, relating the 
minima to credit spreads may be an improvement from 
that perspective (Gordy, 2009), but their behaviour 
has not been uniform across stress periods. To be 
sure, these illustrations do not rule out the possibility 
of developing rules. However, they do highlight that 
discretion and judgment may be necessary too.
Any efforts to build up and release buffers in a 
credible way will need to address head-on a major 
issue: as strains materialise, markets may prevent the 
drawdown from occurring. The recent experience 
has highlighted how at times of turbulence a sharp 
rise in the risk aversion and uncertainty of investors 
will require institutions to raise their capital cushions. 
There are ways in which this risk can be reduced. 
One is having buffers and minima that are sufﬁ  ciently 
high, underpinned by a credible framework, so that 
the solvency of the institutions does not come into 
serious doubt. Another is communicating the rules 
of the game clearly, so that their application is not 
seen as a departure from standard practice, which 
could signal serious concern with the condition of 
the banks. Even so, it is hard to judge at this stage 
whether these steps would be sufﬁ  cient to allow an 
effective operation of the buffers.
2|3 Institutional  set-up
Two key issues that need to be addressed in the 
institutional set-up for the implementation of the 
framework are the needs to ensure accountability and 
to align objectives with the available know-how.
Accountability calls for a clear mandate, transparency 
and effective processes to hold policymakers 
responsible. Accountability is especially important 
to discipline any reliance on discretion that 
complements automatic stabilisers. It can generally 
be enhanced by making sure that the measures 
used are as simple and transparent as possible. 
One could imagine a set-up similar to the one now 
being employed for monetary policy. At the same 
time, given the lags involved and the inevitable 
“fuzziness” in deﬁ   nition and measurement, it 
would be unrealistic to expect that an equivalent 
degree of accountability and transparency is feasible 
(Borio and Drehmann, 2008).
Addressing the imperfect alignment between goals, 
instruments and know-how in the institutional set-up 
is a difﬁ  cult and controversial task. At a minimum, a 
ﬁ  nancial stability framework with a macroprudential 
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orientation requires close cooperation between a 
broad range of authorities with respect to both its 
development and its implementation. After all, a 
wide range of policies, under the responsibility of 
authorities with very different perspectives, has a 
bearing on ﬁ  nancial stability.
At the same time, a key ingredient of success is to 
leverage the comparative advantage of the various 
authorities involved. This is especially important 
for monetary and prudential authorities. Monetary 
authorities have an edge in understanding the 
nexus between the macroeconomy and the 
ﬁ  nancial system and the functioning of ﬁ  nancial 
markets. Prudential authorities have an edge in 
understanding the risk management practices of 
the regulated institutions. For instance, one could 
set up special committees involving these types 
of authority and charged with implementing 
those macroprudential overlays in regulatory 
and supervisory tools that are executed on a 
discretionary basis. In all of this, it is critical 
to ensure a sufﬁ   cient degree of operational 
independence from the political process. As in 
the case of monetary policy, it is essential to “take 
away the punchbowl when the party gets going”.
There is now a widespread recognition in the policy community of the need to strengthen the macroprudential 
orientation of ﬁ  nancial regulatory and supervisory frameworks. This swell of support could not have been 
anticipated even as recently as a couple of years ago. The current ﬁ  nancial crisis has been instrumental 
in underpinning it. So far, policy initiatives have largely focused on addressing procyclicality – the time 
dimension of the macroprudential approach. Looking ahead, more attention will likely also be devoted to 
addressing common exposures within the ﬁ  nancial system – the cross-sectional dimension. The task now 
is to examine concretely the spectrum of policy options, so as to evaluate their desirability and feasibility. 
The BIS is actively involved in this process.
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